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It is tempting to posit an intimate relationship between belief and assertion. The speech act of 
assertion seems like a way of transferring the speaker’s belief to his or her audience.  If this is 1
right, then you might think that the evidential warrant required for asserting a proposition is 
just the same as the warrant for believing it. In other words, when you have sufficient evidence 
to entitle you to believe something, you have sufficient evidence to entitle you to assert it. This 
is a natural consequence of the assumption that you should only try to induce someone else to 
share a belief if you are entitled to have the belief yourself. Let’s call the thesis that the level 
of evidence that entitles one to belief a proposition is the same as that which entitles one to 
assert it entitlement equality.  
Even philosophers who disagree about the norms of assertion can agree on entitlement equality. 
For example, Williamson and Lackey both seem to be committed to entitlement equality, despite 
their different accounts of the norms of assertion. Williamson [1996, 2000, chapter 8] advocates 
a knowledge norm for assertion, arguing that a constitutive norm of assertion is that you must 
only assert p if you know p. Williamson also (more tentatively) endorses the thesis that a 
knowledge norm governs belief: you must only believe p if you know p.   So Williamson seems 2
committed to entitlement equality. Lackey [2007] disagrees with Williamson about the norm of 
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 Grice [1957] went so far as to give a reductive analysis of meaning and assertion in terms of intentional 1
belief transference. 
 Williamson puts forward this thesis in Knowledge and Its Limits:  2
We can suggest something more radical. Belief does not aim merely at truth; it aims at knowledge. The 
more it is justified by knowledge, the closer it comes to knowledge itself.(208)  
It is plausible. . . that occurrently believing p stands to asserting p as the inner stands to the outer. If 
so, the knowledge rule for assertion corresponds to the norm that one should believe p only if one ... 
knows p.... Given that norm, it is not reasonable to believe p when one knows that one does not know 
p. (256-257)  
We are not entirely sure what is meant by ‘occurrent belief’ as opposed to just plain belief, but  it is clear 
that (recently at least) Williamson endorses the knowledge norm for belief generally. In recent work 
[2013], he has put forward the knowledge norm for belief as a consequence of his view that ones evidence 
is just one’s knowledge (‘E = K’):  
Given E = K, the requirement to conform one’s beliefs to one’s evidence is the requirement to conform 
one’s beliefs to one’s knowledge. Believing only what one knows is then a natural understanding of that 
requirement. (92) 
The E = K thesis together with requirement that one believe only what one knows entail the requirement 
that one believe propositions that are entailed by one’s evidence, beliefs that have (‘evidential’) 
probability 1. Further arguments for knowledge as the norm of belief can be found in Williamson 
[forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b].
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assertion: she argues that an assertion of p only requires as evidential warrant that it be 
reasonable to believe p. In so arguing she directly endorses entitlement equality. 
Entitlement equality is false.   It is false, we argue, because belief is weak. What we mean by 3
this is that the evidential standards that are required for belief are very low.  That belief is weak 
makes entitlement equality false because the evidential standards for assertion, whatever they 
are, are much higher than those for belief.  To be more concrete, we argue below that merely 
thinking that a proposition is likely may entitle you to believe the proposition.  By contrast, 
thinking a propositions is likely does not, normally, entitle you to assert it.  The thesis that belief 
is weak is of independent interest because it goes against the grain of many philosophical 
accounts of belief according to which belief is a mental state akin to sureness or certainty.   We 4
accept that there may be a theoretical notion of outright or full belief that is strong, and that 
shares the same evidential norms as assertion, but we argue that this does not correspond to our 
basic concept of belief.  5
Our first argument that the evidential requirements for belief are weaker than those for 
assertion comes from considering Moore-paradoxical sentences, such as the following: 
 (1) ?? It’s raining but I’m not sure it’s raining.  
We need an explanation of why (1) is an infelicitous assertion. One explanation is that in order 
to be entitled to assert p you need to be sure that p.  In this case, anyone asserting (1) must be 6
sure that they are not sure that it’s raining, but they also must be sure that it’s raining.  While 7
this may be possible (if sureness does not iterate), it seems like an uncomfortable position and, 
so, can explain the oddness of (1).  
Let us contrast (1) with this sentence: 
 We are not alone in rejecting entitlement equality. Milne [2012], for example, writes, ‘Sincere assertion 3
requires a stronger epistemic standing than belief’ and Stanley [2008] also rejects entitlement equality. 
 Those who explicitly equate belief with full credence include de Finetti [1990], Levi [1991, 2004], Clarke 4
[2013] and Williamson (though the latter prefers his notion of evidential probability, not credence).  In 
fact, our arguments below will also go against other weaker, but not weak enough, accounts of belief, e.g. 
Ross and Schroeder [2014] p. 280: “It is rational to believe a proposition p only if one’s evidence 
significantly favors p over its negation.” Indeed many epistemologists endorse this thesis (at least 
implicitly) perhaps because like Ross and Schroeder they think it “is difficult to deny.” [ibid.] The 
requirement that  For a recent defense of a view that clearly complies with this general characterization, 
see, e.g., Leitgeb [2014] or  Smith [2010]. In general, views that require beliefs to be consistent and 
sufficiently supported by evidence, will either require beliefs to be fully supported by evidence, or 
restricted in some other evidentially demanding way.
 We should note also that we are not committed here to the idea that there are constitutive norms of 5
assertion at all [see Pagin, 2011, for an argument for this negative view]. But even if there are not, our 
arguments still show that in most typical speech-act situations, having a rational belief in p does not 
entitle you to assert p. 
 It is not completely clear how requirement on assertion follows from accounts of the evidential norms of 6
assertion such as Williamson’s and Lackey’s. Such data might support a principle that in order to assert 
something you need to be certain of it, which Stanley [2008] endorses. Williamson would seem to need 
something like a default principle that if you mention a specific piece of knowledge you are sure of it. (In 
the case of knowledge, this also might explain why it seems strange to say of one person that he knows 
that p but isn’t sure that p.) See Williamson [2000, p. 254], for further discussion.
 Assuming when you are sure that p and not q you are sure of p and sure that q is false. 7
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 (2)  I believe it’s raining, but I’m not sure it’s raining. 
There doesn’t seem to be anything bad sounding about (2). Suppose, however, the standards for 
assertion are the same as those for belief. Asserting that it’s raining, we saw, is not normatively 
compatible with asserting that one is not sure it’s raining. So, believing that it’s raining should 
not be normatively compatible with not being sure it’s raining. If (2) is a true assertion, it is 
reporting a normatively defective mental state: having a belief that is not warranted by the 
evidence. However, to our ears, (2) does not seem to be any kind of admission of irrationality. 
So, it seems that one can believe p even if one has not ruled out the doxastic possibility that p is 
false. However, one cannot assert p in these circumstances. This suggests that the standards for 
asserting p are strictly higher than for believing p. This is not a peculiarity of the particular 
sentence (1), rather it holds generally that an assertion of a belief allows epistemic hedging in a 
way that a straight assertion does not. Consider, for instance, this related contrast:  8
 (3)  I believe it’s raining but I know it might not be. 
 (4)  ?? It’s raining, but I know it might not be. 
There are limits to how much this argument alone can show. For we might think that 
conversation is governed by distinct norms from belief that disallow the epistemic hedging of (1) 
without also entailing that the evidential standards are higher for assertion those for belief. 
Here we follow a roughly Stalnakerian picture of conversation where the goal of assertion is to 
add a proposition to the common ground, roughly the set of propositions that are presupposed 
(or mutually taken for granted) in the conversation [Stalnaker, 1974]. We might assume that it is 
part of the practice of conversation that the common ground is always taken as certain; what is 
in the common ground is not doubted for the purposes of conversation. In this case (1) and (4) 
would be odd because they are both proposals to add that it’s raining to the common ground, 
and expressions of doubt about the proposition that it’s raining. So they are both putting forward 
that it’s raining as something that is not to be doubted and as something that is doubted by the 
speaker. This could explain their infelicity. Nothing in this account however, entails that in order 
to put something forward for the common ground, one must not have any doubts about it. 
Rather we just assume that putting something forward for the common ground is putting it 
forward as something that is not doubted for the purposes of the conversation. Thus, distinctive 
norms of conversational practice can explain why (1) and (4) are unacceptable while (2) and (3) 
 These examples are particularly surprising since, as Yalcin [2007] notes, any use of ‘p and might not p’ is 8
infelicitous when embedded under an attitude verb. So we cannot say:  
(i) ?Tim believes that it’s raining and that it might not be raining.  
Given that (3) is acceptable we should not take (i) to show that belief in p is incompatible with belief in 
the epistemic possibility that p is false. Rather there may be a semantic or pragmatic explanation of why 
(i) is bad, as in Yalcin [2007], Klinedinst and Rothschild [2012], Dorr and Hawthorne [2013]. Assuming 
knowledge entails belief, the lack of oddness in ‘Tim believes that it’s raining but he knows that it might 
not be’ is evidence that this combination is not epistemically defective. 
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do not seem to be admissions of epistemic irrationality in a manner compatible with entitlement 
equality.  9
Another tact one might take is to simply deny that a sentence like (3) reports a belief at all. For 
example Stanley [2008] claims of a similar sentence (of the form ‘I believe φ but don’t know φ) 
that it is not in fact a belief report. He writes:  
However the function of using “I believe” [in the sentence] is to qualify support for the truth 
of a proposition, rather than endorse it. In short, such uses of “believe” are not cases in 
which one reports a belief that p at all; they are rather cases in which one reports that one 
has weak reasons in support of the the truth of a proposition.  
This view of sentences like (2) and (3) suggests a radical mismatch between the literal meaning 
of ‘believe’ and what it is used to expressed in these sentences. This should be avoided if 
possible as the non-literality of ‘belief’ in these cases does not cohere with any systematic 
pragmatic story we know about ‘belief’. Our position, and the natural default view, is that 
‘believe’ is used in its ordinary literal sense in (3). 
Luckily, there are direct considerations in support of the idea that the epistemic standards for 
assertion are stronger than for belief. One comes from lottery cases. Many argue that one 
cannot felicitously assert that one’s lottery ticket with a one in a hundred chance of winning 
won’t in fact win [e.g. Dudman, 1992, Williamson, 2000]. However, at least intuitively, it seems 
reasonable to believe that one’s lottery ticket will lose in these situations. If this were not the 
case no one would be even initially bothered by the lottery paradox. This data is problematic for 
anyone who endorses entitlement equality and thinks that lottery sentences are unnassertable. 
Of course, these judgements about lottery cases might be denied.  But the data suggests that 10
having a norm of belief on par with that for assertion is revisionary of our ordinary practice in a 
way that, e.g., the knowledge norm of assertion does not appear to be.  
We will further support the thesis that the standards for belief are weaker than those for 
knowledge by making two points. The first is that belief is as weak as a variety of other states 
that might pre-theoretically seem weaker than belief, the second is that the word ‘believe’ is 
 On this Stalnakerian picture, the norms for any given assertion might be relative to the purposes of the 9
conversation. In this case, as Seth Yalcin (p.c.) suggested to us there might not be, as Pagin [2011] argues 
with regard to norms generally, any general notion of the norms of assertion. 
Note that even on this picture — that may be used to salvage entitlement equality — belief is compatible 
with rational doubt. Thus, the Williamsonian brand of entitlement equality isn’t saved nor is the thesis 
that rational belief must be knowledge with (evidential) probability 1.
 Williamson [2000, p. 256], for instance, seems committed to the idea that belief that one’s lottery 10
ticket is a loser less than perfectly rational in these cases. Note that he also refers to ‘outright belief’ in 
this context, which we argue below is a technical concept that does not correspond to belief in the 
ordinary sense. Cohen and Comesaña [2013] claim that rationality doesn’t permit degrees of irrationality, 
and so not being perfectly rational is equivalent to being irrational. In any case, in recent work Williamson 
does not qualify irrationality but instead distinguishes between unjustified belief and unjustified but 
excusable belief.
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not ambiguously expressing both a strong sense, as strong as assertion, in some contexts and a 
weak sense in other contexts.  
Let us consider other ordinary expressions for belief-like states such as ‘think’, which is the most 
standardly used non-factive attitude verb. We can run all the arguments above with ‘think’ just 
as well as with ‘believe’. One might be tempted to say that ‘think’ expresses a weaker epistemic 
state than ‘believe’. However, if this were the case it would be possible for someone to be in a 
state in which they think it’s raining but they don’t believe it’s raining. Intuitively, an attribution 
of such a mental state is contradictory:  11
(5)  ??Tim thinks it’s raining, but he doesn’t believe that it is.  
All this is unsurprising, as it is widely accepted that the verbs ‘think’ and ‘believe’ are 
synonyms.  However, consider the state of being of the opinion that p. This might appear to be 12
a weaker epistemic state than believing that p. However, similar considerations show that it is 
not. For it seems contradictory to say:  
(6)  ??Tim is of the opinion that it will rain, but he doesn’t go so far as to think/believe that it 
 will. 
Thus it seems that even the expression ‘being of the opinion that’ picks out a mental state as 
strong as believing. This shows that the norms for belief cannot be stronger than the norms for 
being of the opinion that. 
Most surprisingly, it seems that even suspecting may be as weak as believing, or close anyway. 
For some people find the following sort of sentence odd:  
 A worry about this argument is that due to what is called neg-raising, which we discuss below, negated 11
attributions of belief often are interpreted as attributions of belief in the negation. So, saying ‘I don’t 
believe it will rain’ seems tantamount to saying ‘I believe it won’t rain.’ This could explain why (5) is 
contradictory without recourse to the thesis that thinking entails belief. However, this explanation fails to 
explain a range of other data. First, note that if neg-raising were really obligatory then the following 
sentence would sound contradictory which it does not:  
(i) Tim doesn’t believe it’s raining, nor does he believe it’s not raining.  
In addition, even when there is not an explicit sentential negation there is plenty of evidence that ‘think’ 
is not weaker than ‘believe’. For example, if it were the following sentence would sound coherent:  
(ii) ??Martha thinks it’s raining, but Ned believes it’s raining. 
Compare this, for instance, to: 
(iii) Martha likes to do the dishes, but Ned loves to do them.  
Neg-raising cannot explain this contrast since ‘likes’ is also neg-raising. 
 Though we note here a number of differences between ‘think’ and ‘believe’. ‘Believe’ but not ‘think’ 12
can be modified by ‘firmly’ and ‘fully’. Having a belief that p seems equivalent to believing p, but 
thinking p doesn’t seem equivalent to having the thought that p. ‘Think’ also allows a progressive use that 
belief does not: ‘I was thinking that John would win, but then I realized he wouldn’t.’
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(7) ?Tim doesn’t actually think that John stole the painting, but he suspects that he did.  13
This is less categorically contradictory-sounding then the previous examples, but some consulted 
suggest that there is some sort of oddity at least in (7). Note also that in legal contexts suspicion 
is often defined as a genre of belief. For example: ‘SUSPICION. A belief to the disadvantage of 
another, accompanied by a doubt’ [Bouvier, 1856]. Similar observations apply to other weak 
epistemic attitudes:  14
(8)  a. ?Tim has some confidence that it will rain, but it’s not that he thinks it will rain.  
 b. ? Tim half-expects that it will rain, but it’s not that he thinks it will rain.  
 c. ?Tim is tempted to think that it will rain, but it’s not that he thinks it will rain.  
These examples suggest that, at least for some, ‘believe’ is a bit like ‘open’: when something is 
open to any degree it is open, when you believe something to any degree you believe it. 
We don’t take a firm stance here on whether, in fact, it is possible to suspect/half-expect/be 
tempted to think/have some confidence that p without thinking p, as the status of the 
judgments here is not sufficiently clear. We do note that if belief is as weak as at least one of 
these attitudes, then it is clear that the norms governing belief must be weaker than assertion, 
for merely suspecting p does not entitle one to assert p. So these observations suggest that 
entitlement equality is false. Moreover, if belief is as weak as any of these attitudes then a 
knowledge norm (or a truth norm) cannot govern belief, for no one would argue that one should 
only suspect p when p is known (or true).  
Further support for the thesis that ‘believe’ is weak comes from consideration of the linguistic 
phenomenon called neg-raising [Fillmore, 1963, Prince, 1976]. When saying that you don’t 
believe p you often suggest that you believe not-p, i.e. that you disbelieve p. This is called neg-
raising because the negation seems to be read further on in the sentence: not as negating the 
mental state verb but as negating its content. Neg-raising occurs with all the belief-like mental 
state expressions we have discussed so far, ‘believe’, ‘think’, and ‘is of the opinion that’. Neg-
raising does not, however, occur with ‘know’: saying ‘John doesn’t know p’ doesn’t suggest that 
John knows not-p.  
What we want to observe is that only weak mental state verbs allow neg-raising. In the belief 
realm, ‘is certain that’, ‘is sure that’, and such expressions do not give rise to neg-raising. In the 
realm of desires, ‘want’, the weak term, allows neg-raising, but ‘need’ does not. In the realm of 
 We use ‘??’ to indicate more infelicity than ‘?’. For a minimal pair compare to ‘Tim doesn’t actually 13
believe that John stole the painting, but he hopes that he did.’
 These examples come from Williamson (p.c.).14
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attitudes, ‘like’ the weak term allows neg-raising, but ‘love’ does not.   In the realm of advice, 15
‘advise’ and ‘recommend’ allow neg-raising while ‘command’, ‘demand’ and ‘order’ do not.  
Thus considerations of neg-raising suggest that ‘believe’ and ‘think‘ are, like ‘is of the opinion 
that’, weak expressions. The weakness of the expressions suggests that the standards for 
rationally holding them are lower than those of assertion and knowledge. 
A possible way of rescuing entitlement equality (and a knowledge norm for belief) is to plead for 
an ambiguity in the term ‘believe’. On this view ‘believe’ has at least two meanings: it has a 
weak sense in which it means something like being of the opinion that or suspecting and a 
stronger meaning in which attributes full belief. The idea would then be that entitlement 
equality (and a knowledge norm) only apply to the latter, stronger sense. However, the examples 
above show that this cannot be right. For if ‘believe’ had two senses it should be possible to 
attribute belief in the weaker sense but deny it in the stronger sense. But we have seen that we 
cannot say of a single person that they are of the opinion that p but lack the belief that p. Thus, 
‘believe’ is not ambiguous: it is simply weak.  16
We now want to make some suggestions about what does entitle one to believe a proposition. 
One standard view, the threshold view, is that you are entitled to believe p just in case you are 
entitled to have a sufficiently high credence in p. Usually it is thought that the threshold must 
be at least above 50%. Observations by Swinburne [1983] and Jeremy Goodman (p.c.) suggest 
that this is not right. To take Goodman’s example, consider a three-horse race. Assume that 
horse A is more likely to win than horse B which in turn is more likely to win then horse C (so the 
probabilities of winning could be known to be 45%, 28%, 27%). In this case it seems fine to say ‘I 
think horse A will win’ or ‘I believe horse A will win’.  17
Interestingly, this piece of data does not eliminate the idea that the threshold for believing p is 
that you find p likely or probable. As Yalcin [2010] observes in cases like the above it is also 
acceptable to say ‘Horse A is likely to win’ or ‘Horse A will probably win’.  Thus, it seems that 18
finding something likely may in fact be the right evidential warrant for believing it: but, 
surprisingly, thinking something probable does not require believing it more likely than not.  
The case above might tempt one to think that it is sufficient for thinking something probable 
(and hence having warrant to believe it) that it be more likely than its salient alternatives. If 
 Of course, neg-raising in its canonical form only applies when these terms take propositional 15
complements, as in ‘I like/love that John made me breakfast’ or ‘I would like/love to go to the movies’.
 The lack of ambiguity in ‘believe’ and ‘think’ may be surprising to those who posit wide-spread semantic 16
or pragmatic ambiguity across natural language predicates.
 ‘Think’ seems slightly more natural here, but ‘think’ often feels more natural. Note also it is awful to 17
say, in this case, ‘I think horse A will win but I don’t believe it will’.
 We note in both cases that these judgments are not completely universal, but they seem fairly robust. 18
Of course, all these judgements could represent some form of cognitive error [see Windschitl and Wells, 
1998] , but we agree with Yalcin that it is more likely that they reflect somewhat surprising aspects of our 
notion of likelihood and belief. 
 7
this is right, then belief is relative to something like a partition of the relevant outcomes [as 
Yalcin, 2010, suggests]. This is a rather strange situation: for while in some contexts we might 
think that horse A will win in the scenario above, if the salient partition is just the proposition 
that horse A will win and the proposition horse A will lose, then we will not think that horse A 
will win. 
Clearly, then, seemingly valid arguments about beliefs will turn out to be false if they involve a 
shifting of the salient partition. For example the argument from think p to not think not-p is not 
valid if the partition is shifted.  19
However, upon examination the view that one thinks p just in case p includes all the likely 
alternatives in a salient partition cannot be right, as Yalcin (2010) observes. In a lottery in which 
one ticket has a 2% chance of winning and every other ticket a 1% chance of winning, it would 
seem odd to believe that the 2% ticket will win or to think it probably will win. Thus, the 
threshold view might not be entirely wrong: to believe something might require a) it be 
significantly more likely than the salient alternatives, and b) it be above some contextually 
determined threshold of likeliness.  We do not pretend to be giving the full conditions for being 20
warranted in believing p here, but just to suggest a rough preliminary account.  
This line of thought can be strengthened by considering the practice of asking questions like 
‘Who do you think will win the election?’ In general a wh-question presupposes that there is at 
least one positive answer. This explains why it is strange to ask, ‘Who are you confident will win 
the election?’, unless it’s already taken for granted that there is one person who the addressee 
is confident will win the election. But note that asking, ‘Who do you think/believe will win the 
election?’ does not seem to make any strong presupposition about the addressee’s knowledge. So 
it seems that thinking/believing p does not even require being confident that p. This supports 
the idea that thinking p just requires thinking p is likely. The reason that the evidential 21
standard for thinking p likely are no lower than those for thinking p may be that thinking p likely 
entails thinking p. We can make the same argument as we made above with being of the opinion 
that p or suspecting p: there does not appear to be a coherent mental state in which one thinks 
p is likely without thinking p. The incoherence of such a state is suggested by the fact that the 
following sentence sounds bad:  
 Note, however, that any partition relativity in ‘think’ or ‘believe’ cannot be too easily switched or it 19
would allow contradictory sentences such as ‘I think horse A will win but I think horse A will lose’ to be 
acceptable.
 Significance might be very weak, but we do not want to say just more likely because it does not seem 20
like only a minuscule difference is sufficient, as Yalcin also observes.
 If we accept this equivalence of thinking p and thinking p likely a new problem arises. For in this case 21
believing that p is likely would require believing that p is likely is itself likely.  This iteration effect might 
seem to make belief even weaker than we propose.  One option is to adopt a non-standard semantics for 
belief attributions according to which believing p is likely just requires having a belief state that makes p 
likely, e.g. Yalcin [2010] and Rothschild, [2012].  
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(9)  ?Tim doesn’t think John will win nor does he think John won’t win, but he thinks John is 
 likely to win. 
It is worth noting that viewing thinking p as no stronger than thinking p likely yields a partial 
explanation of why neg-raising occurs with ‘think’ and ‘believe’. When p and not-p are relevant 
alternatives, the only case in which you don’t think either p or not-p is likely are ones where you 
think they have roughly even chances (or have, in any case, no opinion one way or the other). 
Thus, as long as one assumes that you have any view at all about p versus not-p, not thinking p 
will entail thinking not-p. Since indifference between p and not-p cannot be guaranteed we do 
not have a full explanation of neg-raising, but we at least can explain why it is a plausible 
inference in many cases.  22
The considerations above provide another direct argument against entitlement equality and 
against the thesis that believing p normatively requires knowing p. It is clear that one can be 
fully justified in thinking something likely without being entitled to assert it or knowing it. But 
we have seen that thinking or believing p is likely is sufficient for thinking p. In this case 
entitlement equality must be false. In addition, this line of thought indicates that believing p 
cannot normatively require knowing p.  
We should note here that while belief seems to have weak evidential norms, certainly weaker 
than those for assertion and possibly even weaker than having over 50% overall credence, other 
epistemic attitudes related to belief do not. Being certain or being sure, for instance, have 
much stronger evidential norms than belief. Nothing we have said suggests that the evidential 
norms for these notions are weaker than those for assertion. In the philosophy literature one 
often sees reference to ‘outright belief’ or ‘full belief’. The main use in the literature of these 
terms is to distinguish merely believing something probable from believing simpliciter. This may 
be a useful theoretical notion distinct from certainty and sureness, and it may be one for which 
norms comparable to those for assertion apply.  However, our arguments above indicate that 23
this notion is not a disambiguation of what we ordinarily mean by ‘belief’; rather it seems a 
theoretical posit. Thus, those arguing for the importance of outright or full belief as a notion 
stronger than ordinary belief but distinct from believing or being certain cannot argue for it on 
 Note that this view also explains saying ‘Tim doesn’t think/believe Bill will win, but he doesn’t think/22
believe Bill won’t win’ suggests that Tim gives roughly even chances or has no information at all.
 For example, Wedgwood [2012] writes ‘we typically assume that a sincere assertion of a proposition p 23
expresses an outright belief in p.’ So, he takes the close relation to assertion as an essential mark of 
outright belief.
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the basis of its commonsense status as grounded in our talk about belief.  The everyday notion 24
of belief is a weak one.  25
Suppose there is an important notion FB (for ‘full belief’) for which entitlement equality holds 
(leaving open the question of whether the term ‘full belief’ picks out FB in English).  What can 26
we say about it? For one thing, the badness of examples like (1) and (3) suggest that FB is 
incompatible with any kind of doubt. Many epistemologists like to think that knowledge entails 
the relevant sense of belief, so in this case knowledge would need to entail FB. But if knowledge 
entails FB than you cannot know anything for which you have doubts, which might be a 
worrisome consequence, since we tend to think we know in cases where we are not certain. So 
it seems like the advocate of FB as the relevant notion of belief either has to deny that 
knowledge entails FB or has to deny that we ever have knowledge in cases where there are 
doubts.  27
We have argued that the norms of assertion are stronger than those for belief. We might want to 
ask why this is so. Here we can only speculate, as other norms for assertion (including a belief 
norm) would be completely coherent. However, they may lack important features that a stronger 
norm (such as a knowledge norm) has. We note one feature that may be relevant. If we work 
with an attitude that does not require full confidence to hold, assertion might not be an 
effective means of sharing that attitude. For if A finds out the B has, say, 99% confidence in p, A 
might not raise his confidence to 99% even if he trusts that B has reached this confidence solely 
on the basis of good, non-misleading evidence. So, if 99% confidence were the norm of assertion, 
even a fully trusting audience who accepted an assertion that p might not then be in a position 
to assert p himself. More generally, finding out that someone correctly has come to have a high 
confidence in p does not immediately tell you what attitude to have towards p. On the other 
hand, finding out that someone knows p forces you to accept p yourself. Thus it seems that 
 In particular, those who stress the importance of outright belief tend to do so against a Bayesian 24
eliminativism about the notion [e.g. Sturgeon, 2008]. In this literature it is generally taken for granted 
that the notion of outright belief is the commonsense one. Our point here is that this is far from clear.
 Similarly, we might think that the mental act verb ‘judge’ is not weak in the way belief is. Williamson 25
considers belief to be the inner analogue to assertion, but it seems that judging is a closer analogue as, 
like assertion, it is an act. Note also that ‘judge’ is not neg-raising: saying you don’t judge that it’s raining 
doesn’t suggest you judge it’s not raining. Also it is not clearly contradictory to say of someone that they 
believe p but do not judge that p. It as at least plausible that the evidential warrant required for judging 
that p is stronger than that for believing p. Tellingly, perhaps, the verb ‘judge’ in this general sense has 
little currency outside of philosophical contexts.
 It is clear, however, that locutions like ‘firm belief’ do not pick out the right notion. There is nothing at 26
all defective about firmly believing your lottery ticket will lose, even if there are only probabilistic 
grounds for this.
 Of course, one way out of this dilemma is to use the conversational strategy sketched on page 4 to 27
explain (1) and (3), so maintaining that FB is compatible with doubt [this is the strategy pursued by 
Stanley, 2008].
 10
having an evidential standard like knowledge allows for efficient transference of information in a 
way that merely requiring belief does not.  28
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